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Identifying Implicit Collusion  under Declining
Output Demand
Ananda Weliwita  and Azzeddine  Azzam
The  "trigger  price"  oligopoly  model  is  used  to develop  a  test  for  oligopolistic  as
well as oligopsonistic conduct by observing how an industry responds  to unexpected
declines  in  output  demand.  The hypothesis  that U.S.  beef packers  maintain  cooper-
ative  pricing  strategies  is rejected.
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Introduction
Baker's empirical  "trigger  price"  oligopoly  model is used to develop  a test  of oligopo-
listic  as  well  as  oligopsonistic  conduct  by observing  industry's  response  to  unexpected
declines in output demand.  The basic idea behind the model, introduced earlier by Green
and Porter, is that an industry behaving  as a cartel will be more competitive  after a large
unexpected decline in output demand. This behavior is interpreted as a punishment mech-
anism practiced by members of a cartel who cannot distinguish between negative demand
shocks  and rival  cheating.  This  article makes  inference  about cartel conduct in the U.S.
beef packing industry by testing whether  the industry's oligopoly markup and oligopsony
markdown  decrease  following  large unexpected  declines  in beef demand.
Concern  about oligopoly/oligopsony in the beef packing industry has prompted several
empirical  studies.  The  change  in  the  structure  of the  industry,  however,  occurred  in
concert with declining demand for red meat, beef in particular.  The link between industry
oligopoly/oligopsony  conduct  and beef demand,  however,  has  yet to be explored.  Live-
cattle supply effects  on packer conduct have been the focus of two past studies  (Koontz,
Garcia,  and Hudson;  Stiegert,  Azzam, and  Brorsen).  Other  studies  estimated the  size of
the oligopsony  distortions  (Azzam;  Azzam and  Park;  Schroeter;  Schroeter  and Azzam).
Koontz,  Garcia,  and  Hudson's  study,  which  also  uses  the  "trigger  price"  model,  infers
the  degree  of oligopsony  power  using  day-to-day  movement  in  regional  beef margins.
Packers were  assumed to be price  takers in the beef market.  Koontz, Garcia,  and Hudson
found  beef-packer  oligopsony  alternated  between  periods  of cooperative  and  noncoop-
erative  pricing  conduct.  Stiegert,  Azzam,  and  Brorsen  used  national  data to  study  the
effect  on packer conduct  of inadequate  cattle supply.  Shortfalls  in cattle supply  induced
packers  to  increase  the  markdown,  apparently  to  ensure  a  margin  adequate  to  cover
processing  costs.
While  cattle  supply  is  undoubtedly  important  in  determining  industry  conduct,  beef
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demand is postulated by industry  observers as the single most important factor explaining
the changing  structure  of the industry  (Purcell).  Although the intent of this article  is not
to empirically verify demand-induced  structural change,  it should provide some measure
of  demand-induced  conduct.  The  findings  should  also  contribute  to  the  inventory  of
analyses  of industry  conduct using  alternative  oligopoly/oligopsony  theories.
Conceptual  Model
The  model  links  three  vertically  related  industries:  cattle  feeders,  beef  packers,  and
wholesalers/retailers.  Cattle feeders  are price takers and supply live cattle to beef packers.
Packers  combine  the material input with nonmaterial inputs  to produce  dressed or boxed
beef.  Packers sell the beef to wholesalers/retailers.  Packers are not necessarily price takers
in the material input and output markets.  They may oligopsonistically  purchase live cattle
and  oligopolistically  sell  boxed  beef.  The beef-processing  technology  is  assumed to  be
of fixed  proportions.1 This  allows,  with  appropriate  conversion,  the output and  the ma-
terial input to  be denoted by the  same variable.
The hypothesis to  be tested  is that if packers follow  cooperative  pricing  strategies  in
both  cattle  and  beef  markets,  then they temporarily  revert  to  competitive  pricing  after
unexpected  declines in beef demand.  Reversion  to competitive  pricing  during periods  of
uncertainty  is interpreted  as  a policing  mechanism  to  punish cheating  by rival packers.
Firms  behave this  way  because  they  are unable  to  distinguish  between  unexpected  de-
mand  declines  and  rival  cheating.  Competitive  pricing  following  large  unexpected  de-
clines in demand implies  shrinking packer oligopoly markup and oligopsony markdown.2
To  construct  an empirically  implementable  model,  let  the inverse  market  demand  D
faced  by the packing industry  for processed  beef be
(1)  D: P  = f(Q,  Y)  +  ,
and the inverse  live-cattle industry  supply curve  S be
(2)  S:  W = g(Q, Z)  +  v,
where  P, Q,  and  W are  retail  price  of beef,  quantity  of beef,  and  price  of live  cattle,
respectively.  The vectors  Y  and  Z include  exogenous  shifters  of beef demand  and  live-
cattle supply,  respectively.  The errors  e and  v represent random  errors.
Industry marginal  processing  cost is
(3)  MPC = cm(Q,  G)  + A,
where  G  is  a  vector  of nonmaterial  inputs  used  in  the  processing  of beef,  and  A is  a
random shock.
Since  the  industry is not  assumed to be  a  price  taker in the beef market,  the inverse
demand  function in (1)  defines the  following marginal  revenue function:
1  This  assumption  is appropriate if beef-packing  firms  cannot effect  dressing yields in the short run. However,  as Mullen,
Wohlgenant,  and  Farris  note,  substitution  possibilities  may exist  at  the  industry  level  even  if the  technology  is  of  fixed
proportions  at the firm level. The authors also note that the boxed-beef technology  itself has been a source of input substitution
(p.  250).
2 This  result hinges  on  assuming that  packers  do  not  have  perfect  knowledge  of cattle  inputs  and beef  outputs  of  their
rivals.  If packers did  indeed know about their rivals'  inputs and outputs,  as  one reviewer  contends,  then the applicability  of
the Green-Porter  model to the beef industry  is questionable.
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(4)  MR  = f(Q, Y) +  Qfq(Q, Y) +  ,
where fq(Q  Y)  is  the  slope  of the  demand  function.  Similarly,  the  live-cattle  supply
function in  (2)  defines  the marginal  expenditure  function:
(5)  ME= g(Q, Z)  +  Qg(Q, Z) +  v,
where gq(Q, Z) is  the slope  of the  live-cattle  supply function.
Total marginal  cost (MC) is the sum of marginal processing cost (MPC) and marginal
expenditure  on live cattle  (ME). Equality  of MR and MC implies
(6)  f(Q, Y  + Qf(Q,  Y)  +  e  = cn(Q,  G)  +  A +  Qgq(Q,  )
+  g(Q, Z)  +  v.
Denoting  the margin  P  - W by M, letting  Qfq(Q, Z)  = MR  - P  [from  (4)],  Qgq(Q, Z)
= ME - W [from  (5)],  and rearranging  terms in (6)  results in the  margin relation:
(7)  M =  O(P - MR)  + y(ME-  W)  +  c'.(Q, G)  + A,
where  6(P  - MR) is the  oligopoly distortion,  and  y(ME  - W)  is the oligopsony  distor-
tion. The parameters  0  and  y index oligopoly  and oligopsony  conduct, respectively.  If 0
=  y =  0,  the margin,  M,  equals marginal processing  cost, implying perfect competition.
In the pure monopoly/monopsony  case  (0  =  y  =  1),  the margin  exceeds  that under the
perfectly  competitive  case  by  the  monopoly  markup  (P - MR)  and  the  monopsony
markdown  (ME  - W).  Values  between  0  and  1  for  0  and  y  represent  the  industry's
average  index of oligopolistic  and  oligopsonistic  conduct in  the beef and  cattle market,
respectively.
To establish how demand shocks effect the margin through their effects  on the conduct
parameters  0  and  y, use  (4)  and (5)  and rewrite  (7)  as follows:
(8)  M =  -(e)Qfq(Q,  Y) +  (e)Qgq(Q, Z)  + cm(Q,  G)  + A,
where  0  and  y  are  now functions  of the  demand  shocks  E. Also,  since  W  =  P  -M,
rewrite  (2)  as
(9)  P  = M + g(Q, Z) +  v.
Total  differentiation of (1),  (8),  and  (9), holding  Y, Z,  G,  A, and  v constant,  yields
(10)  dP = fqdQ +  de,
(11)  dP =  gqdQ + dM + dv,
and
(12)  dM  =  -Ofq  - - QfqdQ  - QfqOedE +  ygqdQ
+  YQgqqdQ  +  QgqeYde  + cqdQ +  dA,
where fq  =  af(Q,  Y)/aQ,  fqq  =  d2f(Q,  Y)/aQ2,  gq  =  dg(Q, Z)/dQ,  gqq  =  a
2g(Q,  Z)/aQ2,  cq
=  cm(Q,  G)/aQ,  O, = a0/9e, and  y,  =  dy//e. Arranging  (10),  (11),  and  (12)  in  matrix
form gives
1  -fg  0  dP  rde
(13)  1  -gg  -1dQ  =  dv ,
0  T,  1  dM.  T2
where
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Tj  =  O(fq  +  Qfqq)-  y(gq  +  Qgqq)  - Cq,
and
2 =  -(QfqO  - Qgqy.e)  de +  dA.
Under  the null hypothesis  that conduct  does not vary  with  e, that  is  60  = y  = 0, the
response  of the margin to  the demand  shock is
(14)  dM,  C-  (fq  +  Qfqq)  + Y(gq  +  Qgqq)
dE  Cq  + gq - fq  - (fq  +  Qfqq)  +  Y(gq  + Qgqq)
If conduct does  respond  to  demand shocks,  that is,  0,  0  0  and  sy , =  0,  the response  of
the margin  to the demand  shock is
dM2 Cq-  6(f  +  Qfqq)  +  y(gq  +  Qgqq)
(15) dE  cq  + gq - fq  - (f  +  Qfqq)  +  y(gq + Qgqq)
-gq(Qfqo  - Qgq^Ye)  + fq(Qfq  - Qgq6Ye)
Cq  - (  +  g-fq-0(  +  f  gq)  +  (  Qgqq)
In general,  the sign of dMlIde in (14)  will be positive  when demand  and supply  curves
are linear  so thatfqq = gqq  = 0, the demand curve  is downward  sloping  (f<O), and the
supply  curve is upward  sloping  (gq>0).3
Since  the  right-hand-side  first term  of  (15)  and  the  right-hand  side  of (14)  are  the
same  and  the  additional  term  of  (15)  is positive,  the  term  dM2/de is  also positive  but
larger than dMldE. Therefore,  if unexpected  declines  in demand  are measured  as  large
negative  values  for  E, then the  margin  declines  more  when  0 and  y vary  with  E than
when  they  do not vary with  e. This forms  the basis  for the hypothesis  test.
Empirical Model
To estimate industry's response in input and output markets  to unanticipated  declines  in
beef  demand,  an econometrically  estimable  version  of  (7)  is  needed.  Assume beef  de-
mand and live-cattle  supply,  respectively,  take the linear forms:
(16)  PB= ao  +  aoQB +  3 2Qp  +  +  a4I +  ,
and
(17)  QB  =  +  1WC  + t 2WPC +  1 3WF  +  V,
where  PB  is the  wholesale price  of beef;  ,QB  Q,  and  Qc are per capita consumption  of
beef, pork,  and  chicken, respectively;  I is per capita disposable  income;  We is the price
of cattle received by farmers;  Wpc  is price of corn; and  WF is price of feeder cattle. The
ais,  and  I3,s  are  parameters  to  be  estimated.  The  error  terms  are  denoted  by  e  and  v.
Given the demand function (16),  the perceived marginal revenue defined by (4) becomes
(18)  MR  = PB  +  aiQB.
3  Subscript  1 in (14)  indicates  0 and  y are constant,  and subscript 2  in (15)  indicates  0 and  y vary  with  e.
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Similarly,  given  the  live-cattle  supply  function  (17),  the  marginal  expenditure  function
in (5)  becomes
(19)  ME = Wc  +
Marginal processing  cost, MPC, is assumed to  take the linear form:
(20)  MPC =  6o  +  8,QB  +  82COST +  A,
where  COST is  an index  of marketing  costs.  Making  use  of (18),  (19),  and  (20),  the
margin relation in  (7)  can  now be rewritten  as:
(21)  M =  8o  +  (S  - Oa,  +  y/3,)QB  +  S2COST +  A.
When  0 and  y  do  not  vary  with  the  exogenous  variables  in  the  demand  and  supply
equations, the linear demand and live-cattle  supply functions allow identifying the margin
relation  in (21)  with exclusion  restrictions.  Although the margin  relation is identified,  it
is not possible to disentangle  0 and  y, even though estimates for a, and f8,  can be obtained
by  estimating  demand  and  supply  equations,  separately.  To identify  0 and  y,  a rotation
in  both  the  demand  and  supply  equations  are  required  (Bresnahan;  Azzam  and  Park).
The rotation  of the  demand  equation  can be  achieved  by including  an interaction  term
into (16)  involving  QB  and  an  exogenous  variable  (e.g.,  I).  The  new demand  function
becomes
(22)  PB= ao +  aQB + a2Q  +  a3Q  +  a4I  + a6 QBI +  E.
The perceived  marginal revenue  function associated  with (22)  is
(23)  MR  = PB +  QB(al  + a61).
Similarly,  the  supply  curve  can  be  rotated  by including  an interaction  term  in  (17)  in-
volving  We  and  an exogenous  variable.  The price  of diesel,  Ws,, a  proxy  for transpor-
tation  cost,  was  chosen  for the interaction  term.4 The new  supply function  is
(24)  QB  =  30  +  1 Wec  +  3 2WPC  +  33WF  +  3 4WCWDS  +  v.
The marginal  expenditure  function  associated with the  new supply function  is
(25)  ME =Wc +  QB
(I1  +  /3 4WDS)
Making  use  of (23)  and (25),  the margin  relation in  (21)  becomes
(26)  M =  o0  +  OQ*  +  yQ*+  +  SQB  +  S2COST + A,
where  Q*  =  -QB(al  +  a61),  and  Q2  =  QB/(,1  +  3 4WDS).  The  coefficients  of  Q*  and
Q*2  (0 and  y)  are measures  of industry conduct  in  the beef  and  cattle  markets,  respec-
tively.  The  margin  relation  in  (26)  consists  of three  components:  an oligopoly  markup
(0Q*),  an  oligopsony  markdown  (yQ*),  and  marginal  processing  cost  (80  +  6SQB  +
82COST +  A).
4 Necessary  and sufficient  conditions  for identifying  the degree of competitiveness  in the output market from industry price
and  output  data  are presented  in Lau.  For  oligopoly,  this  is  achieved  by  employing  an inverse  demand  function  which  is
separable in exogenous  variables.  In the case of oligopsony,  the condition  requires an inclusion of an interaction term in the
supply function (Azzam and  Park).
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To test the hypothesis  that industry conduct becomes  more competitive  following  un-
expected  declines  in  beef demand,  0  and  y  are  assumed  to  be  linear functions  of the
demand shocks,  namely,
(27)  0  =  0*  +  rTE,
and
(28)  Y =  Y*  + /e,
where  0* and  y* are  intercepts,  and  r1  and  A.  are slopes.  Substitution of  (27)  and  (28)
into (21)  yields
(29)  M =  o  Q  +  q(E  +  y0*Q  +  ((eEQ*)  +  yQ*  +  (*)  +  +  2COST +  A.
The hypothesis  that industry conduct becomes  more competitive  in  beef and cattle  mar-
kets  is  equivalent  to  the  hypothesis  that  7]  and  pL  are  negative  and  significant,  thus,
lowering the  industry  margin following  unexpected declines  in beef demand.
Demand shocks will make firms behave  more competitively only if they lead firms to
suspect  an increase  in  output by the competing  firms. This  implies  that only  large neg-
ative  shocks affect  0 and  y. Small unexpected demand shocks will not alter firm behavior
since they will not be  sufficiently large enough  for firms to  suspect an increase in output
by competing  firms. On the other hand, unanticipated increases  in demand  will not make
firms  act  more  competitively  by producing  more  output  because  of the  possibility that
such  behavior will trigger  a price  war.5
In  order  to  determine  how  conduct  is  affected  by large  negative  demand  shocks,  a
dummy  variable  (DUM)  is  created  from  the  vector  of  demand  residuals  (RES).  The
variable DUM takes  a value of 1 when RES  is a large negative  number in absolute value
and  0 for small negative  values  and for positive values  of RES. Thus, DUM is triggered
in periods  during which the competing  firms feel the greatest threat of increase in output
by  competing  firms,  hence  the  greatest  incentive  to  increase  their  own  output.  Substi-
tuting DUM for  e in  (27)  and (28)  yields
(30)  0  =  0*  +  rjDUM,
and
(31)  y =  Y*  4 + DUM.
Incorporating  (30)  and (31)  into (29)  gives
(32)  M =  So  +  0*Q*  +  rqDUMQ*  +  y*Q*  +  +  IDUMQ*  +  2 QB  + 
- 2COST + A.
The  comparative  statics  showed  the  decline  in  the  margin  is  steeper  when  0  and  y
vary  with e than when  they do  not vary  with e [compare  (14)  and (15)].  Comparison of
(26)  and  (32) will verify  this  proposition.  Equation  (32)  is  (26)  plus the two  additional
terms,  q7DUMQ* and  ,IDUMQ*.  Since they  are both  negative  (because  r7<0  and /<0),
the margin  in  (32) is  smaller than the margin in  (26). In other words,  when unexpected
demand  declines  are  large  enough  to  trigger  the  dummy  variable  to  take  the  value  of
5There  exists  no relationship  between  the  size of the  triggering  demand shocks  and  the length of the  resulting price  war
(Porter).  Stated differently,  once an  unexpected  price  decline  is  large  enough  to  create  a suspicion  in  firms  of increase  in
output  by competing firms,  the duration of firms'  competitive  behavior  does  not vary  with the size of the triggering  demand
shock.
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one,  firms  in  the  industry  respond  by  becoming  more  competitive,  thus  lowering  the
margin.
The variable DUM is  created according  to the following  rule:
(33)  DUM =  1  if E <  -Ts,
=0  if E - -Ts,
where  T is  a  scalar,  and  s  is  the  estimate  of  the  standard  error  of the  beef  demand.
According  to  (33),  the  variable  DUM takes  the  value  of  1 when  es  in  the RES  vector
are  greater  in absolute value than  Ts,  and the value  of 0 for all the  other  Es.  When T =
0, DUM will take the value  1 for all the negative demand shocks and 0 for all nonnegative
demand  shocks.  Hence, zero  is the lower  bound for T which  ensures that DUM will be
triggered for all the negative  demand shocks.  The upper bound for T is  - ls, and this  T
value  will be  associated with the  largest negative  demand shock in absolute value.
6
Having  established  the range for T, a grid search is used to search for the  T value that
maximizes  the likelihood of observing  the supply  equation  (24)  and the margin relation
(32).  The hypotheses  that  -q<0 and  LI<O  are  individually  tested  using  one-tailed  t-test
against the null hypotheses  that  ,/ =  0 and  /x =  0.
The full  model is
(34)  PB =  a  +  aQB +  a2Qp  + a3Qc +  a4 +  a5QBI  +  E,
(35)  QB  =  P0  + /l W  +  f3
2WPC +  1 33WF  + 
3
4WCWDS  + J5QB,t-1  +  ,
and
(36)  M =  0 +  O*Q*  +  rqDUMQ  *  +  TyQ*  +  LDUMQ*
+  81QB  +  S2COST +  A.
The demand  equation  (34)  includes  interaction  between  per capita income I and  per
capita  consumption  of beef QB,  seasonal dummies  (D2,  D3, and D4)  representing  second,
third, and fourth  quarters, and per capita consumption  of pork and chicken.  In the quan-
tity  dependent  live-cattle  supply  function  (35),  price of corn  (Wpc)  and  price  of feeder
cattle  (WF)  are supply  shifters.  The lagged  dependent  variable  (QB,  -)  accounts  for the
effects  of long-term  trends in the live-cattle  supply.  Prices of live cattle, corn,  and feeder
cattle are converted to  averages of the current and  the previous  three quarters  to capture
the  effect  of  price  expectations  on  cattle  supply  (Marsh;  Freebairn  and  Rausser).  The
marketing cost index,  COST, in (36)  is a weighted  average of food processing input prices
(Harp).  All price variables were  deflated by the GNP implicit price deflator  (U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce).7 Quarterly data for the period  1978.1 through  1993.III were used  for
the analysis.  Description of the variables  and  sources of data  are  listed in  table  1.
Results
Since  residuals  from  the  demand equation  are  needed  to  create  the variable  DUM,  the
demand  equation  must  be  estimated  separately  from  the  rest  of the  system.  However,
6 This is  the same  criterion  used by  Baker.
7  The  model was  also estimated  using nominal  prices.  Though the coefficient  estimates  were,  as  expected,  different from
the model using real prices,  results  of the hypothesis tests  were qualitatively  the same.  The results  reported in this article are
those  obtained from the model with  real prices.  Those  using nominal prices are reported  in Weliwita.
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Table  1.  Variable  Names,  Definitions,  Units of  Measure, and Sources
Variable  Definition  Unit  Sourcea
PB  Estimated weighted  average wholesale  price  cents/lb.  LPS
of choice  yield grade  3  beef
We  Beef net farm value  =  market  value to pro-  cents/lb.  White et al.
ducer of 2.4  lb.  live animal,  equivalent  to  and  LPS
1 lb.  of retail cuts,  minus farm by-product
allowance
M  Farm-wholesale  marketing  margin  =  P  - cents/lb.  LPS
Wc
QB  U.S.  per capita  commercial  beef production  lbs.,  retail  weight  LPS
Qp  U.S.  per capita  commercial  pork production  lbs.,  retail  weight  LPS
Qc  U.S.  per capita  commercial  chicken produc-  lbs.,  retail  weight  LPS
tion
I  Per capita  aggregate disposable personal  in-  $  LPS
come
WPC  Price  of corn  $/bu.  AGOUT
WF  Price  of feeder  steers,  choice  (Kansas  City)  600-700 lb.  LPS
WDS  Wholesale  price of No.  2  diesel fuel  cents/gal, tax  excluded  MER
COST  Food marketing  cost index  1967  =  100  Harp
a LPS is USDA/ERS, Livestock and Poultry Situation and Outlook; AGOUT  is USDA/ERS, Agricultural
Outlook; and MER  is USDA/EIA,  Monthly Energy Review.
demand shocks  are not independent  of supply  shocks if the covariance  matrix of supply
and demand residuals is not diagonal. Using Breusch and Pagan's test, the null hypothesis
of a  diagonal covariance  matrix  was not rejected  at the 5%  level.8
The two-stage  least  squares  estimates  of the  demand  function  are presented  in  table
2.  The model was  tested for first-order serial correlation  using the Durbin-Watson  statis-
tic.  The test statistic  (1.85)  falls  within  the inconclusive  range.  All coefficients  are sta-
tistically  significant  at  the  5%  level,  except  the  own  slope  and  the  third-  and  fourth-
quarter  seasonal  dummies.
Nonlinear  three-stage  least squares  (3SLS)  estimates  of the  supply  equation  and  the
margin  relation  are  presented  in  table  3.  The system  fits the  data  well. The McElroy's
system  R2 is  0.86.  The  coefficient  for the  cost  index  was  negative  but not  significant.
Time  was included  to  account for long-term  trends in  marginal processing  cost.  A neg-
ative  and  marginally  significant  coefficient  for  time  indicates  a shift  in  marginal  pro-
cessing  cost over  the  sample period.  The  coefficient  for  QE  in  the margin relation  rep-
resents  the  slope  of the  marginal  processing  cost.  This  coefficient  is  not  significantly
different  from  zero.  It may  be  that  the marginal  processing  cost  function  is horizontal
over the range  of the data.
Table  3  also  shows  that  both  r7  and  /L are  not  different  from  zero,  implying  that
unexpected  declines  in  demand  for beef did  not enhance  the  degree  of industry  com-
petition in beef and cattle markets.  In other words, packers did not maintain a cooperative
pricing  strategy  in cattle  and beef markets.  Table 4 reports two subsidiary  tests of price-
taking behavior  in input  and  output  markets.  The price-taking  hypothesis  in the  output
market  is tested by testing  the restriction that  0*  =  17* = 0.  Similarly,  the price-taking
8 The chi-squared  statistic is 0.397 and the critical value  with one degree of freedom  is  3.84.
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Table 2.  Results  of 2SLS Estimation of the Beef Demand
Equation (34)


















a Denotes  significance  from zero  at  1% level  with a two-tailed  t-test.
b Denotes  significance from  zero at 5%  level  with a two-tailed  t-test.
Table 3.  Joint Estimation Results  of Fed Cattle Supply
(35)  and Margin Relation  (36) Using  Nonlinear 3SLS






















































McElroy's  R2 0.86
N  60
a  Denotes  significance  from  zero at  1% level  with a two-tailed  t-test.
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2 X205  Conclusion
Perfect  competition
in output market  4.4611
(Ho:  0*  =  r*  =  0)  18.1652  5.99  Reject Ho
Perfect competition
in input  market
(Ho:  y*  =  /u*  = 0)  1.55  5.99  Do  not reject Ho
Degree of competition  0  =  0.659
in output market  (1.60)
Degree of competition  y  =  0.004
in input market  (1.09)
Note:  Figures in parentheses  are  asymptotic  t-ratios.
hypothesis in the input market is tested by imposing the restriction y* =  A,* = 0. While
competition  in the beef market is rejected,  it was  not rejected  in  the cattle market.  The
estimated  oligopoly  distortion,  as  a  percentage  of the margin, is in  the neighborhood of
2.7%. 9
Findings  of the present  study  are  brought into  light in conjunction  with  some  of the
previous  market  power studies  in  beef packing  (table 5).  At least one  of the objectives
of all  the various  studies  was  to  test the price-taking  hypothesis  in  beef/cattle  markets.
Though  these studies  differ widely with  respect to  analytical  method,  type  of data,  and
period  of  study,  the  findings,  in  general,  are  not  consistent  with  perfect  competition.
9 The average distortion,  as  a. percentage  of the margin,  was calculated  as  (0*Q*  + -qDUMQ*)/M.
Table 5.  Summary Results of  NEIO Studies  of Beef Packing
Type  of
Author(s)  Dataa  Sample Period  Distortion  Findingsb
Schroeter  A,  N  1951-83  3%(WH),  1%(FC)  FC(yes),  WH(yes)
Schroeter  Q, N  1976.I-86.IV  14%(WH),  13%(FC)  FC(yes),  RE(yes)
and Azzam  55%  of margin
Stiegert et al.  Q, N  1972.I-86.IV  1.31%(FC)  FC(yes)
Azzam  M, N  Jan.  1988-Mar.  1991  Not available  FC(yes),  WH(no)
Azzam  and  Park  A, N  1960-87  Not  available  FC(no)  1960-77
FC(yes)  1978-87
Koontz et al.  D  July  1980-Sep.  1982  $5-19/head  (1984-86)  FC(yes)
July 1984-July  1986  $2-5/head  (1980-82)
This article  Q, N  1978.I-93.III  2.7% (Farm WH  FC(no), WH(yes)
margin)
a A  =  annual,  Q  =  quarterly,  M  =  monthly, D  =  daily, N  =  national, FC  = fed-cattle  market, WH =
wholesale market,  RE  = retail  market.
b Yes  = evidence  for market power,  No =  no  evidence for market  power.
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Results  of the  present  study  do  not,  however,  provide  evidence  that  packer conduct  is
noncompetitive  in  the  cattle  market.  However,  evidence  that  packers  exercise  market
power in the beef market is in  concert  with the findings  of many previous  studies.
Summary and Conclusions
The  objective  of this  article  was  to make  inference  about market  conduct in  input  and
output  markets  from  observing  how  an  industry  responds  to  unexpected  declines  in
demand.  The  technique,  an  extension  of  a  "trigger  price"  oligopoly  model,  tests  the
hypothesis  that  firms behave  more competitively  in both  input  and  output  markets  fol-
lowing  large unexpected  declines in demand. The model is based  on the proposition that
when  firms do  not have  perfect information  about their rivals,  oligopoly/oligopsony  be-
havior  is  influenced  by  inferences  firms  make  about  rival  behavior  following  random
declines  in demand.
Results  do not provide evidence that packer conduct in beef and cattle markets became
more  competitive  following  large  unexpected  declines  in  beef  demand.  Thus,  the  hy-
pothesis  that packers  maintain  cooperative  pricing  strategies  in  cattle  procurement  and
beef sale is rejected.  This result is consistent with Koontz, Garcia,  and Hudson's findings
using more  disaggregated  data.
Two  auxiliary  tests were  conducted to  test price-taking  behavior.  Packer  oligopoly  in
the beef market  is not rejected.  The oligopoly distortion,  however,  is smaller  than those
reported in previous  studies.  Packer oligopsony  in cattle procurement  is rejected.
[Received April 1995; final version received February 1996.]
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